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This report considers the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on bilateral 
trade flows. First, it describes the evolution of PTAs since the end of WWII, noting that PTA 
formation has trended upward since the late 1980s. As of April 2021, there are 349 active PTAs 
in force. However, international trade economists have only recently developed empirical 
strategies to consistently estimate the average effect of a PTA on bilateral trade. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) showed that - after accounting for endogeneity bias using panel techniques - 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Global society has long relied heavily on the exchange of goods and services. 
During the 1930s, the U.S. imposed tariffs under the Smooth-Hawley tariff act. This 
movement brought about numerous retaliatory tariffs by other countries on U.S. exports. 
This protectionism was an important ingredient contributing to the disintegration of the 
world economy before World War II. The post-WWII era witnessed a concerted effort, 
led by the U.S. and other countries, to foster cooperation in international matters. In this 
environment, we should interpret the role played by the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination in promoting efficient outcomes in the multilateral trading system 
(Bagwell & Staiger, 1997, pp. 281–325). 
 Trade negotiations among 23 countries in 1947 led to the formation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1995, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was formed. Unlike the GATT, it represents a permanent 
multilateral institution that elaborates and oversees international trade rules and provides 
an elaborated dispute settlement process. Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2016, p. 4) show 
that the main pillars of the GATT are multilateral rules that prohibit non-discrimination 
and promote reciprocity. As they explain, GATT members have to negotiate and respect 
the application of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs, which simply means that, if a 
GATT member exacts a tariff on a particular product, the same tariff must be extended to 
all exporters that are members of that agreement. Thus, the MFN rule prevents 
discrimination. Notably, member countries have successfully carried out eight rounds of 
multilateral negotiation under the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (De 
Gruyter, 2009, pp. 587–610).  
2 
Essentially, this principle argues that tariff modifications should lead to equal 
changes in the values of a country’s export and import volumes, which neutralize terms-
of-trade effects during tariff negotiations. According to World Bank (2019) data, the 
average tariff rate on manufactured products applied by Japan, the European Union, and 
the U.S. is 4.1%, 3.22%, and 4.15%, respectively. These tariffs represent a small fraction 
of their levels before multilateral negotiations were undertaken after WWII. The principle 
of reciprocity then creates an environment where members do not pursue the use of tariffs 
for terms of trade gains. Thus, multilateral liberalization efforts have been undertaken 
successfully through the negotiation rounds held between 1947 and 1994: Geneva (1947), 
Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Geneva (1960–61) (also known as the 
Dillon Round), the Kennedy Round (1962–67), the Tokyo Round (1973–79), and the 
Uruguay Round (1986–94). In general, these rounds had different goals. The first five 
rounds concentrated exclusively on tariff negotiations. The main aim of the Kennedy 
Round was the negotiation of non-tariff measure obligations. However, it could not 
completely achieve its goal. The Tokyo Round contributed more to the regulation and 
control of non-tariff measures than it did to tariffs (Jackson, 1997, p. 74). The negotiated 
multilateral agreements “reduced average tariffs on industrial goods from forty percent 
(1947) to less than five percent (1993)” (Wilkinson, 2006). Table 1 displays details of 







Table 1：Scope and success of the tariff-reducing activity of GATT1 
Round Dates Number of 
countries 






Geneva 1947 23 $10 billion 35% “Not available” 
Annecy 1949 33 Unavailable 35% “Not available” 
Torquay 1950 34 Unavailable 35% “Not available” 
Geneva 1956 22 $2.5 billion 35% “Not available” 
Dillon 1960–61 45 $4.9 billion 35% “Not available” 
Kennedy 1962–67 48 $40 billion 35% 8.7% 
Tokyo 1973–79 99 $155 billion 34% 6.3% 
Uruguay 1986–94 120+ $3.7 trillion 38% 3.9% 
Source: Jackson, 1997, pp. 74 
De Gruyter (2009, pp. 587–610) states that multilateral negotiations carried out 
under the auspices of the GATT/WTO are designed to avoid opportunism and increase 
available information about any member’s trade policy. WTO negotiations strive to 
reduce MFN tariff rates through the imposition of binding tariff rates. This strategy 
ensures that countries cannot legally raise them in the future, giving members greater 
certainty with regard to other members’ trade policies. In addition, members of the 
GATT enforce the application of negotiated tariff bindings by requiring members to 
express barriers to trade in the form of tariffs. This process of “tariffication” demands 
that members essentially convert non-tariff barriers (e.g., quotas and export subsidies) 
into tariffs so that the costs of protectionism are more apparent and easier to negotiate. 
 
1 The tariff averages refer to tariffs on the non-primary products of industrial countries. 
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 The GATT is an agreement focused on the liberalization of trade in goods. It 
aimed to liberalize trade by reducing tariffs and removing quotas among member 
countries. Examples of the application of non-tariff barriers include the U.S.’s voluntary 
export restraints on Japanese autos during the 1980s, which were equivalent to a tariff 
rate exceeding 60% (Branstetter, 2017). Additional examples include the Steel Trigger 
Price Mechanism of 1982–1984 and the Farm Bill of 1981–1984, which sought to protect 
the interests of the steel industry and landowners, respectively. By contrast, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) seeks to liberalize trade in services across 
nations. A somewhat novel program negotiated during the Uruguay Round, the GATS 
does not mandate the liberalization of all services. Still, it promotes voluntary 
liberalization and enforces that liberalized service items are not restricted again. 
Despite the key role played by the MFN rule on the GATT/WTO, the possibility 
that countries exchange preferential tariffs is possible among WTO members. Article 
XXIV of the GATT regulates the formation of customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas 
(FTAs). The key distinction between these two PTAs is that the customs unions require 
the implementation of a common external tariff, while the latter allows countries to apply 
different external tariffs. Notice that this Article requires that member countries 
essentially apply duty-free trade on preferential imports and prohibits members from 
increasing their tariffs on non-members. It then represents an additional tool for 
promoting free trade under the auspices of the WTO. Instead, GATT’s Enabling Clause 
allows developing countries to create even partial scope agreements (PSAs), wherein 
preferential trade can be more limited. Developing countries can exchange preferences by 
5 
creating PTAs that do not adhere to Article XXIV (Mansfield & Reinhardt, 2003, pp. 
829–862). 
 The formation of PTAs has been on an upward trend since the late 1980s. As of 
April 2021, there are 560 active regional trade agreements (RTAs) 2  in force, but 
agreements that include goods and services count as two agreements using under the 
WTO criterion. In this case, 314 notifications under the GATT Article XXIV, 184 under 
GATS Article V, and 62 enabling clauses for the contracting parties (WTO, 2021). The 
acceptance of PTAs gave rise to new recommendations and implementations for tariffs to 
be set at or close to zero among preferential partners. These can be in the form of free 
trade areas (FTAs), CUs, PSAs,3 and economic integration areas (EIAs).4 In this case, 
EIA refers to an agreement in goods (FTA/CU/PS) that also covers services beyond the 
commitments under the GATS. For example, the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) represents an FTA that also liberalizes trade in services, thereby also receiving 
the label of an EIA. On the other hand, the European Union represents a customs union, 
with deep integration in service activities, becoming an EIA as well.   
A partial trade agreement frees up trade between two or more countries for a few 
industries. For example, the PSA between Brazil and Mexico that was established in May 
2003 enhances bilateral trade between the two countries by eliminating barriers to trade 
in goods. However, current WTO documentation suggests that no PSA has been extended 
 
2 In this report, we use the terms PTA and RTA interchangeably. 
3 Partial scope agreements: partial scope which is not defined or referred to the WTO agreement, 
means that the agreement covers only certain products. 
4 Economic integration is the unification of economic policies between different states, through 
the partial or full abolition of tariff or non-tariff restrictions on trade. 
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to cover services. On the other hand, several FTAs and CUs have evolved to include 
trade in services, and these tend to promote conditions that allow cross-border 
investments, facilitate trade-related dispute resolution, and sometimes establish 
competition policies. 
 PTAs usually follow the No Double Counting Clause, whereby the parties intend 
that an agreement’s provisions be applied in a manner that prevents any item of refund, 
credit, offset, abatement, taxes, or expenses from being charged or applied more than 
once. This clause ensures that the prices are equalized for the members of a PTA. 
However, the WTO has struggled somewhat to apply its regulations on PTAs. For 
instance, PTA members are required to declare new preferential groupings to GATT 
working parties (before 1995) and the WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(since 1995). These bodies, which assess the degree of PTAs’ compliance with 
GATT/WTO rules, have failed to reach a judgment on all but one of the 118 PTAs 
submitted for review. This outcome is due mostly to differences among WTO members 
about what constitutes compliance (Mansfield & Reinhardt, 2003, pp. 829–862). 
Regardless, Limão (2016, pp. 358–360) states that these PTAs share one common 
feature: a policy that aims to increase market access for at least one member.  
Despite its popularity, PTAs do not necessarily improve member countries’ 
welfare, at least in theory. According to Viner (1951), trade diversion is associated with a 
welfare loss because the change does not create new trade. Instead, it represents 
switching imports away from more efficient producers to less efficient ones. Instead, 
trade creation refers to welfare gains since the preferential partner switches from costly 
domestic production to more efficient preferential partners. Below we provide a graphical 
7 
illustration of trade creation and trade diversion and use this graph to explain Viner’s 
(1951) original intuition about the effects of PTAs. 
 
Figure 1: Trade creation and trade diversion 
Panagariya (2000, pp. 290–293) uses Figure 1 to explain the concepts of trade 
creation and trade diversion outlined in the Theory of customs unions by Viner (1951). He 
explains, “These concepts are best introduced within a model exhibiting infinite supply elasticities 
and zero demand elasticities. The model avoids some of the ambiguities that arise in more general 
models.”  Let us then begin by representing country A’s demand for a product by the 
vertical line 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐴 in Figure 1. Three countries (A, B, and C) supply this product, with 
prices of 𝑃𝐴 , 𝑃𝐵 , and 𝑃𝐶 , respectively. Under perfect competition, these prices also 
represent the constant average and marginal costs of production. In the graph, we observe 
that Country A is the least efficient supplier, so Countries B and C will not import A’s 
product. If the tariff rate is chosen such that 𝑃𝐴 > 𝑃𝐶  +  𝑡 >  𝑃𝐵, then the entire quantity 
demanded, 0𝑄0 , is imported from C. A’s consumers need to pay 𝑃𝐶 +  𝑡  to purchase C’s 
product. A’s government will receive e + f as a tariff revenue from this transaction. When 
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Country A forms a PTA with B, it retains only the tariff on C, and the movement creates 
no new trade. Supplier C is replaced by a less efficient supplier, B. Because of this 
change, Country A loses the tariff revenue. With area e used up to pay for higher production 
cost in Country B. The net loss to A and the world from the union is area e. In Viner’s 
terminology, we call the union trade diverting.  
Instead, suppose the initial non-discriminatory tariff in A is t’. In the graph, we can 
find 𝑃𝐴  <  𝑃𝐶 +  𝑡’ <  𝑃𝐵 +  𝑡’. In this case, the full demand for steel, 0Q0 is satisfied by 
Country A itself. Again, removing t’ on B but not C results in the supplier changing from 
A to B. Country A gains the consumer surplus represented by areas g + f. The union 
creates new trade between A to B, and it is associated with switching from higher cost 
supplier A to lower cost supplier B. In Viner’s terminology, the union is trade creating. 
This trade creation creates welfare gains denoted by area g + f. Thus, Panagariya (2000) 
indicates that trade diversion is associated with welfare loss and trade creation with 
welfare gain.  
 Meade (1955, ch. 2) shows that the relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade 
diversion are insufficient to determine the welfare effect of the union. Losses are 
determined not only by the amount of trade diversion but also by the magnitude of the 
increase in costs by trade diversion. For instance, if we drop the zero-elasticity demand, 
then the welfare effect will become ambiguous even in the presence of trade diversion. 
This can be illustrated in Figure 2. DADA remains A’s demand curve. In the case of trade 
diversion, Country A removes the tariff on B but not on C. The cost of production will 
increase as Country A switches imports to Country B. Thus, Country A loses area e + f in 
tariff revenue from the original imports. However, Country A’s consumers will purchase 
9 
more than Q0. Assume they purchase Q1, and now area f + h denotes extra benefits to A’s 
consumers. Country A then gains the area h on new imports. If area h is bigger than area 
e, then trade diversion improves welfare in this case. Thus, trade creation and trade 
diversion remain a central part of policy debates on PTAs. 
 

















Chapter 2 - Do FTAs increase members’ international trade? 
As mentioned above, the number of PTAs have exponentially increased over the 
past decades. However, international trade economists have only recently claimed 
empirical support from reliable quantitative estimates of the average effect of a PTA on 
bilateral trade (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, p. 73). The gravity model of international trade 
has been the key empirical framework for empirical analyses of the effects of PTAs on 
trade flows for over 50 years. At a cross-section level, the gravity equation explains 
country pairs’ trade flows while controlling for the countries’ gross domestic product 
(GDP), bilateral distances, dummy variables for common languages, the presence or 
absence of a PTA, and whether they share a common land border. Nobel laureate Jan 
Tinbergen (1962) was the first to publish an econometric study using the gravity equation 
for international trade flows. He found that membership in the British Commonwealth 
(Benelux FTA) accounted for only a 5% increase in trade flows. Subsequently, Aitken 
(1973), Abrams (1980), and Brada and Mendez (1985) found that membership in the 
European Community (EC) has an economically and statistically significant impact on 
trade flows among members, whereas Bergstrand (1985) and Frankel, Stein and Wei 
(1995) found insignificant effects. There is a potential endogeneity bias in estimating the 
effect of PTAs on trade volume, thus, international trade economists could not reach 
consistent conclusions on PTA effects until recently. 
11 
 The endogeneity of the variable identifying a country-pair PTA membership is a 
critical concern in estimating the trade effects of PTAs. Endogeneity concerns about how 
trade barriers affect trade flows are common in economics. In a famous example, Trefler 
(1993) estimated the factors that simultaneously drive U.S. multilateral imports and 
nontariff barriers in a cross-industry analysis. He found that using instrumental variables 
to control for the endogeneity of trade policies increases the effects of these trade barriers 
on U.S. imports tenfold. The literature on the determinants of PTA formation provides 
evidence of the endogeneity of PTAs to trade flows (see, for example, Baier & 
Bergstrand, 2002, 2004b; Magee, 2003). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) were the first to 
measure consistently average PTA effects on trade flows by considering different sources 
of PTA formation endogeneity using a comprehensive sample of country-pairs with 
coverage for trade flows over five decades.  
 The most basic version of the gravity equation used in the literature is described 
by equation (1). It is commonly applied to cross-section gravity specifications in 
international trade, as shown in equation (1): 
𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖)
𝛽1 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗)
𝛽2 (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗)𝛽3 𝑒𝛽4(𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗) 𝑒𝛽5(𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗) 𝑒𝛽6(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗) 𝑖𝑗 .    (1) 
Where 𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the value of country i’s export goods to country j; 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the distance 
between countries i and j; and 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗, 𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗, and 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 are binary variables. If i and j 
share a common language, then variable 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗  equals 1 and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗 
assumes the value 1 if i and j share a common land border and 0 otherwise. 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 
assumes the value 1 if i and j have free trade agreements5 and 0 otherwise. e is the natural 
 
5 Baier and Bergstrand’s sample includes FTAs and customs unions, both of which we refer to as 
PTA. 
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logarithm base, and εij is a lognormally distributed error term. PTA and the error term 
(𝜖 − 𝛽6𝜍) have a likely negative correlation. Assuming the trade policy variable is the 
bilateral tariff rate, if the countries share a PTA, then tariff rate = 0 and ς = 1. Otherwise, 
PTA = 0 and tariff rate > 0. Thus, ς < 0, and PTA and ς are positively correlated (Baier & 
Bergstrand, 2007, p. 80). The initial applications of the gravity equation to international 
trade flows had no formal theoretical foundation. Since 1979, the literature has provided 
different formal theoretical economic foundations for the gravity equation, such as in 
Equation (1). 
We can log-linearize Equation (1) and estimate it using decadal information to 
obtain the estimates in Table 2 as follows:  
Table 2: Typical Cross-Sectional Gravity Equation Coefficient Estimates 
Variables 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 0.76 (45.79) 0.88 (57.55) 1.01 (69.37) 1.08 (85.13) 1.18 (104.13) 
ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 0.76 (48.66) 0.92 (63.95) 1.00 (72.69) 0.97 (78.08) 0.98 (87.39) 
ln𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 -0.64 (-16.23) -0.85 (-21.10) -1.06 (-28.15) -1.07 (-28.82) -1.17 (-32.57) 
𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗 0.16 (1.03) 0.14 (0.85) 0.35 (2.18) 0.59 (3.72) 0.74 (4.88) 
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 0.06 (0.65) 0.34 (3.48) 0.56 (5.48) 0.80 (8.16) 0.72 (7.71) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 0.63 (3.46) 1.37 (6.64) -0.13 (-0.73) -0.14 (-0.95) 0.29 (2.85) 
Constant -9.38 (-20.44) -12.17 (-26.88) -16.23 (-35.59) -17.09 (-40.37) -17.94 (-49.11) 
RMSE 1.4163 1.7616 1.8900 1.9919 1.9645 
𝑅2 0.6061 0.6334 0.6446 0.6649 0.7137 
No. OBS 2633 4030 5421 6474 7302 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is (natural log of the) nominal 
bilateral trade flow from i to j.  
Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 76) 
The data come from Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The nominal bilateral trade 
flows are from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics from 1960 
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to 2000, taken at 10-year intervals. For panel analysis, exporter’s GDP deflators are used 
to generate real trade flows, and GDP deflators scale nominal GDPs to create real GDPs. 
The bilateral distances, language, and adjacency dummies are compiled using the CIA 
Facebook. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) considered a single dummy variable, which 
combined the full (impartial) PTAs, that is, the combination of FTAs and CUs. Table A1 
in the Appendix lists the countries used.6 
Table 27 provides cross-sectional coefficient estimates for the relevant years using 
a log-linear version of gravity equation (1). These estimates are generated using the (non-
zero) nominal trade flows between 96 countries, as listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Table 2 provides the coefficient estimates for the highly volatile dummy. For instance, 
the PTA significantly and positively affected trade between two PTA members in the 
1970s, with a 294% increase (e1.37 − 1 = 2.94), but showed a negative effect in 1980 
and 1990. Frankle (1997, p. 62) also showed that membership in the E.C. decreased trade 
in 1970, 1975, and 1980. It is then obvious that the country-pair effects of PTA formation 
show considerable unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, equation (1) does not control for trader barriers applied to international 
trade flows. As we include trade barriers in the gravity equation, price indexes for the 
importer and exporter countries are added. Otherwise, the lack of these additional 
controls would generate trade biases in the specification because these barriers may be 
related to other variables in the model, including the controls for PTA formation. Thus, 
 
6 The data set is available at Baier and Bergstrand’s websites (http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr and 
http://people.clemson.edu/~sbaier). 
7 R² denotes explanatory power ranging from 60% to 80%, indicating 20%–40% unobserved 
heterogeneity influences. 
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log-linearizing equation (1) and adding trade barriers to the model yields a more accurate 
specification as follows: 
𝒍𝒏[𝑷𝑿𝒊𝒋/(𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒋)] = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟑(𝒍𝒏𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒋) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑨𝑫𝑱𝒊𝒋) + 𝜷𝟓(𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊𝒋) +
𝜷𝟔(𝑭𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒋) − 𝒍𝒏𝑷𝒊
𝟏−𝝈 − 𝒍𝒏𝑷𝒋
𝟏−𝝈 + 𝜺𝒊𝒋.                                (2)    
   Equation (2) shows the gravity model equation controlling for the price indexes 
𝑃𝑖
1−𝜎 and 𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 due to the inclusion of trade barriers. These indexes control for the degree 
of multilateral resistance of barriers to international trade. For instance, the trade flows 
between countries i and j are affected by their bilateral barriers as well as by the barriers 
imposed by country j on other trade partners. Thus, if country j raises its barriers to 
imports from country w, then these additional barriers may promote trade between 
countries i and j. However, estimating these price indexes is extremely computationally 
expensive. Alternatively, we can control for the price indexes using exporter- and 
importer-fixed effects.  
Thus, we can write equation (2) replacing the multilateral resistance terms with 
importer- and exporter-fixed effects as follows: 
   ln [
𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽3(𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4(𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼𝑖 +
                𝛼𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗.               (3)          
   Table 3: Theory-motivated Cross-sectional Gravity Equations with Country Fixed Effects 
Variables 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
ln𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 -0.68 (-16.77) -0.89 (-21.58) -1.28 (-31.36) -1.30 (-31.65) -1.46 (-35.79) 
𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑗 0.31 (2.26) 0.35 (2.38) 0.43 (2.95) 0.58 (3.93) 0.59 (4.09) 
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 0.38 (3.99) 0.84 (8.33) 0.82 (8.06) 0.98 (9.41) 0.97 (9.78) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 0.01 (0.09) 0.61 (3.27) -1.44 (-8.65) -1.08 (-7.30) -0.14 (-1.36) 
Constant -14.06 (-8.25) -12.49 (-18.66) -14.98 (-19.37) -16.64 (-31.88) -12.76 (-27.18) 
15 
RMSE 1.1826 1.5025 1.6635 1.7806 1.7851 
Within 𝑅2 0.5020 0.4300 0.3857 0.3648 0.3845 
No. OBS 2633 4030 5421 6474 7302 
        The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) nominal bilateral trade flow from country i 
to country j divided by the product of their nominal GDPs. Coefficient estimates of country fixed 
effects are not reported for brevity. 
Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 77) 
Table 3 above reports the estimates for the same years as those in gravity Equation (2). 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) used importer and exporter fixed effects to account for the 
variation of multilateral price terms Pi
1−σ  and Pj
1−σ . However, the PTA dummy 
coefficient estimates remain unstable year-over-year. Accordingly, the PTA coefficient’s 
estimate is negative in certain years. For instance, although PTA in 1970 increased 
members’ bilateral trade flows by 84%, it reduced these trade flows by 76% in 1980. 
Thus, the country fixed effects do not correct for the bias introduced if countries are 
members of the same PTA. The potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side (RHS) 
variables controlling for the presence of a PTA is the key concern in cross-sectional 
empirical work. When the RHS variables in Equations (1) or (2) are correlated with ϵij, 
the endogeneity of the estimates means that the econometric estimates can be biased. 
Consequently, ordinary least squares (OLS) may yield biased and inconsistent coefficient 
estimates (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, p. 77). These endogeneity biases are caused by 
three reasons: omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error (Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp. 50–51). A potential omitted variable (and selection) bias is the most important reason, 
which we can discuss before other factors. 
 The gravity equation is the major empirical framework to investigate drivers of 
bilateral trade flows because of its strong explanatory power (𝑅2). However, Table 3 
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illustrates that significant unobserved heterogeneity among country pairs remains. PTA is 
not determined randomly. In terms of observable economic characteristics, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004a) present strong cross-sectional empirical evidence stating that country 
pairs that are larger and more similar in GDPs, closer in distance, and more remote from 
other countries tend to have PTAs. Thus, their relative factor endowments tend to have a 
wider difference with respect to each other. This evidence includes the same factors that 
explain larger trade flows. Therefore, most country pairs with PTAs tend to have 
economic characteristics related to considerable trade flows and (in theory) welfare-
enhancing net trade creation attributed to a PTA.  
Assume the error term 𝑖𝑗  represents domestic regulations that inhibit bilateral 
trade. If PTA can expand liberalization beyond tariff barriers into domestic regulations, 
then the two countries will prefer to join the PTA. The reason is that they expect a large 
welfare gain from potential bilateral trade. Whether or not policymakers participate in a 
PTA depends on the trade level (relative to its potential level), rather than on the recent 
change in trade levels. Thus, PTA determinants are likely to be cross-sectional in nature 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, p. 79). These factors point to the presence of simultaneity 
bias in investigating the effect of PTA formation on bilateral trade. If two countries trade 
more than their “natural” level, then political pressure will be applied to avoid trade 
liberalization, holding typical gravity equations RHS variables constant. This situation 
would cause a negative simultaneity bias in the PTA coefficient estimate. When the 
country pairs’ governments trade more than their gravity equation suggested “natural” 
level. The two countries may be induced to form an PTA because political pressure such 
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as high tariffs may decline their trade level. Hence, positive simultaneity bias would 
occur. 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) concluded that PTA and the error term (𝜖 − 𝛽6𝜍) in 
Equation (1) have a negative correlation. As a result, the classical “attenuation bias” of 
PTA’s coefficient estimate approaches zero. They considered this condition one of the 
reasons that the PTA coefficient estimates may be underestimated. Baier and Bergstrand 
aimed to obtain reliable estimates of the treatment effect of a PTA. Accordingly, they 
focused on estimating accurately the ex post effect of a PTA dummy on trade flows. In 
the presence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, most standard econometric 
textbooks suggest the use of panel data as an alternative method for estimating the 
treatment effect in cross-sections. The reason is that a panel data with country-pair and 
year variation can be used to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity with the 
inclusion of country-pair fixed effects.  
In Equation (4), distance, language, and adjacency were eliminated since they 
vary at the country- pair (ij) level and country-pair fixed effects then control for their 
effects. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the exports from country i to country j in year t. 𝛼𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑗𝑡 are exporter by 
year and importer by year fixed effects, respectively. The country-pair fixed effects that 
control for country-pair level omitted variables are represented by αij. The panel fixed 
effects approach provides consistent estimates regardless of the presence of any 
correlation between the time-invariant unobservable 




] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−2) + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 +
              𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗 .         (4) 
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Baier and Bergstrand (2007) note that the formation of PTAs includes long phase 
in periods for preferential tariffs that can take over one decade. As such, they control for 
these long PTA implementation periods by including lagged values of this variable in 
expression (4). They are represented by variables FTAijt−1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 FTAijt−2. In this case, they 
use data for every five years, implying that these two lagged variables control for 5- and 
10-years PTA implementation periods. Estimates for expression (4) can be found in 
Table 4. For instance, column (2) of Table 4 indicates that a PTA promotes trade by 
approximately 58%, the same as the coefficient estimate in column (1) (𝑒0.46 − 1 =
0.58), albeit using trade flows divided by the GDPs as the LHS variable in the former 
case. 
Table 4: Panel gravity equations with bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects8 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 0.46** (9.07) 0.46** (9.06) 0.29** (4.95) 0.28** (4.66) 0.35** (4.20) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1   0.38** (5.62) 0.27** (3.30) 0.16** (1.64) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−2    0.21** (2.60) 0.17** (1.87) 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1     -0.04 (-0.62) 
Constant 8.85** (151.71) -24.59** (429.81) 9.70** (147.93) 10.06** (124.57) 9.98** (93.20) 
Total ATE 0.46 0.46 0.67 0.76 0.68 
Within 𝑅2 0.3102 0.1891 0.3044 0.2750 0.2516 
No. OBS 47,081 47,081 36,563 34,105 27,575 
The dependent variable for specification (1), (3), (4), and (5) is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow; the dependent variable for specification (2) is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow divided by the product of the real GDPs. *(**) denotes statistical significance 
at 5 (1) percent level in one-tailed t-test. Coefficient estimates for bilateral fixed and country-
and-time effects are not reported for brevity. 
 
8 Total Average Treatment Effect (ATE) is the sum of the statistically significant FTA 
coefficient estimates. 
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Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 89)  
The estimates shown in columns 3 through 5 confirm that the role played by phase-in 
periods of PTAs have strong effects on member’s trade flows. These results are in line 
with practical experience with PTA formation. Virtually, every PTA is “phased-in,” often 
over 10 years, such as the NAFTA agreement and the original 1957 European Economic 
Community (EEC) agreement. Thus, the entire economic (treatment) effect cannot be 
captured completely using effects for the concurrent year only. Assume a PTA entered in 
force “legally” in 1990; its economic effect would be fully activated by 2000. Thus, 
having one or two lagged levels of the PTA dummy (𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1  and/or 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−2 ) is 
reasonable. In addition, the economic effects of a PTA include varying terms of trade. 
We can assume that a PTA may be enforced in 1960 and entirely “phased-in” by 1965 
and still impact trade flows until 1970. Columns (3) - (4) in Table 4 provide the results, 
indicating that PTA formation has statistically significant lagged effects on trade flows. 
The coefficient estimates have economically plausible values and balance across periods 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, p. 90). In columns (3) and (4), the cumulative average effects 
with one and two lags are 0.65 and 0.76 percent, respectively. With three lags, the 
coefficient estimate of the third lag was statistically insignificant. The total ATE of 0.76 
implies that the trade level will increase by 114% ((𝑒0.76 − 1) over 10 years due to PTA 
formation.  
Notice that the specification in column (5) tests whether controlling for lagged 
values of PTA eliminates endogeneity concerns. Baier and Bergstrand use the fixed 
effects specification described in (4) to run an additional regression and confirmed that 
trade changes and PTA changes had no “feedback effects.” Wooldridge (2002, p. 285) 
20 
suggested that the “strict exogeneity” of PTA in the panel context can be test easily by 
including the future level of this variable. The conclusion that the lead variable 
(𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1) is not significant indicates that this concern is not present in this empirical 
strategy.    
Chapter 3 - The heterogeneous effect of PTAs  
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) showed that the panel fixed effect approach can 
provide consistent and precise estimates of PTA effects regardless of the correlation 
between time-invariant unobservable variables and the error term 𝑖𝑗. These estimates for 
the PTA dummy variable and its lagged values illustrate that, on average, PTAs increase 
their members’ trade volumes. However, Chapter 1 indicates that PTAs can take different 
forms. In fact, most PTAs take the form of FTAs, followed by PSAs and CUs. It is clear 
then that PTAs may have heterogeneous effect in promoting trade as they may differ in 
the depth of economic integration. Therefore, the average PTA effect investigated by 
Bureau and Jean (2013) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) needs to be extended so that the 
heterogeneous effects of PTAs conditional on their type can be examined. Therefore, in 
this chapter, we focus on the heterogeneity of PTA effects on bilateral trade flows. 
We describe in detail two important papers that focus on the heterogeneous 
effects of PTAs on bilateral trade.  
Chapter 3.A - Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) 
 First, we focus on Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014), which identify six 
main types of PTAs: one-way PTAs (OWPTAs), two-way PTAs (TWPTAs), which 
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coincides with PSAs, FTAs, CUs, common markets, and monetary unions9. Due to few 
observations on common markets and monetary unions, Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng 
(2014) (henceforth BBF) combined the two types of “deeper” PTAs with CUs and 
identified these three agreements by the binary variable CUCMECU, representing “deep” 
PTAs. Then, they studied the heterogeneous effects of PTAs on trade flows by 
controlling for their type using binary variables (OWPTA, TWPTA, FTAs, and CUs 
(deep PTAs)). 
BBF (2014) also consider how PTA type affects trade flows. Essentially, they 
follow the approach outlined in Hummels and Klenow (henceforth HK) (2005) and rely 
on their trade margin-decomposition methodology to show that bilateral imports can be 
disentangled in terms of an intensive margin, an extensive margin, and the importer’s 
total imports. Importantly, HK (2005) described the extensive margin as the fraction of 
goods exported by a country to a trade partner, whereas the intensive margin captures the 
intensity at which an exporter sells products to a specific country relative to its exports to 
all other partners. Thus, BBF (2014) also explore the heterogeneous effects of different 
types of PTA on these margins of trade. In sum, they considered two sources of 
heterogeneity (PTA types, and trade margins).  
The literature points out that considering the different margins of trade is crucial 
to understanding bilateral trade flows.  HK (2005) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of 
the importance of trade margins in explaining trade flows between the U.S. and its 
trading partners. They revealed that 60% of these economies’ exports were attributable to 
 
9 In this chapter, PTA denotes an agreement with only partial liberalization (not free trade). 
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the extensive trade margin (a wider set of goods) rather than the intensive goods margin 
(larger quantities of a given good). Furthermore, they claimed that the faster the exporter 
country’s economy grows, the wider are the set of goods exported. Thus, BBF (2014) 
explored the impact of PTAs on aggregate 10  trade flows and intensive (goods) and 
extensive (goods) margin, country pairs, and years.  
Below, we describe the results found by BBF (2014) where we link PTA types to 
their effects across margins of trade and bilateral aggregate trade. In doing so, we also 
highlight that the effects of PTA on margins of trade may vary across time. These results 
are important for different reasons. First, the relative impact of trade liberalization on the 
intensive and extensive margins influences the estimations of welfare gains. Second, 
although Arkolakis et al. (2012) argued that welfare gains are isomorphic across many 
modern quantitative trade models, but they found that the source of gains can vary across 
models that allow for firm heterogeneity. Thus, the intensive and extensive margin effects 
must be differentiated to identify the precise source of “gains from trade.” Lastly, the 
quantitative path of welfare gains is time-sensitive because the two margins have 
different trade elasticities (BBF.,2014, p. 340). 
The literature highlights the importance of studying the evolution of trade margins. 
Hillberry and McDaniel (2002) used the HK (2005) decomposition to investigate the 
effects of NAFTA on the intensive and extensive trade margins. They provided a 
decomposition of post-NAFTA trade among the three partners into intensive and 
extensive margins using trade flows originally organized at the 4-digit Standard 
 
10 Aggregate refers to all goods (or industries or product categories). 
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International Trade Classification (SITC). Subsequently, Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) applied 
a modified HK’s (2005) decomposition methodology to a series of cross-sectional 
analyses of NAFTA and the Canada–U.S. FTA. They decomposed extensive and 
intensive margin changes post-agreement using original data at the SITC from Feenstra et 
al. (2005). Both studies showed that the formation of NAFTA expands bilateral trade 
flows across members by increasing the intensive and extensive margins of trade. As a 
result, BBF (2014) conclude that their analysis should be conducted based on HK’s 
original definition of trade margins 






















),                                   (5) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚  denotes trade flow of good m from i to j in year t; 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝑚 is the number of firms 
in i and includes exporting and non-exporting firms that produce outputs of good m; 𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑚 
represents good m expenditure; 𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑚  represents unit input requirement of labor, which is 
the lower bound of the Pareto distribution of productivities in good m in i; 𝑦𝑚 is an index 
of productivity heterogeneity of good m among firms; 𝑤𝑖𝑡 denotes wage rate in i; 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 
the variable trade costs of i’s exports  to j; 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the fixed export costs from i to j; and 
𝜎𝑚 is the elasticity of substitution in consumption. The relative price term in the large 
parentheses is a standard representation of the relative prices in the gravity equation. It 
also reflects productivity heterogeneity (from 𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑚  to 𝑦𝑚) and fixed export cost (𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡), c.f., 
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Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008), Redding (2011), and Arkolakis et al. (2012). This model 
shows that 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 will affect 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚  in terms of intensive and extensive margins.  
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argued that the panel fixed effects approach is a 
better method for eliminating the endogeneity bias of PTAs. Based on the endogenous 
self-selection of country pairs into PTAs, they argued that the fixed effects estimation can 
obtain consistent estimates of the partial effect11 of PTAs as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                               (6) 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑗  is country-pair fixed effects (CPFEs), which capture all time-invariant 
unobservable bilateral factors that may affect the likelihood of a PTA; 𝛿𝑖𝑡  and 𝜓𝑗𝑡 are 
exporter by year and importer by year fixed effects, respectively, which capture time-
varying country heterogeneity, such as multilateral price/ resistance” terms (cf., Anderson 
and van Wincoop, 2003). Equation (6) is commonly referred to as a “fixed effects” 
specification. However, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also employed an alternative 
specification as a robustness test, namely, the first difference (FD) specification: 
 ∆5𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(∆5𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿5,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5,𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈5,𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                        (7)  
where ∆5 refers to first differencing over 5 years. Although bilateral CPFEs are removed 
as we take the first difference of the data, importer and exporter fixed effects that vary by 
time remain. They capture changes in time-varying exporter and importer GDPs and 
 
11 Partial effects refer to the absence of general-equilibrium; see Anderson and Wincoop (2003) 
and Baier and Bergstrand (2009) on partial versus general equilibrium trade effects of trade cost 
change.  
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multilateral price terms over the same 5-year period. Changes over time in exporter- and 
importer-specific unobservable variables are captured with 𝛿5 and 𝜓5, whereas changes 
over time in pair-specific unobservable variables, such as falling variable and fixed 
bilateral export costs unrelated to PTAs, are not accounted for. Thus, BBF (2014) add a 
CPFE to Equation (7) to control for unobservable country-pair specific changes over time 
as follows: 
∆5𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(∆5𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿5,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5,𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝜈5,𝑖𝑗𝑡.            (8) 
BBF (2014) expected intensive and extensive margins to be influenced by the 
formation of PTAs in the short and long term, respectively. The reason is that changes in 
volumes of intensive margin do not require startup costs entirely. On the contrary, startup 
costs are critical for extensive margin; thus, new firms need considerable time to begin 
exporting to new market. They evaluated this hypothesis, as will be discussed later. Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007) did not estimate heterogeneous effects on trade flows based on the 
type of PTAs12. Furthermore, no empirical study has examined the differential impact of 
deep PTAs on the extensive and intensive margins relative to PSAs and FTAs, 
particularly the differential timing of such effects. Thus, BBF (2014) address these 
shortcomings.  
First, they described the HK’s (2005) decomposition methodology using the two 
trade margins. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 denote the value of country i’s export goods to country j in year t. 
 
12 Roy (2010) used the panel fixed effects approach and found that CUs promote more trade 
across members than other. 
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Following HK (2005), the extensive margin of goods exported from country i to j in any 








,                                                                                                                (9) 
where 𝑋𝑊𝑗𝑡
𝑚  is the value of imports of product m by country j from the world in year t; 
𝑀𝑊𝑗𝑡 is the set of all products exported by the world to j in year t; and 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the subset 
of all products exported from i to j in year t. Therefore, 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a measure of the fraction 
of all products that are exported from i to j in year t with the weight of each product 
according to its importance in world exports to j in year t. It increases if country j imports 
a larger set of products from country i.  
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where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚  is the value of country i’s export of product m to country j in year t. 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
represents the market share of country i in country j’s imports from the world among the 
set of products that i exports to j in year t. Accordingly, the intensive margin increases as 
country i’s exports levels grow as a percent of the country j’s trade in that product 
category. The product of the two margins equals the ratio of exports from i to j to country 




= 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑋𝑗𝑡⁄              (11) 
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Where 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is country j’s total imports in year t. We can take the natural logs of Equation 
(11) and obtain the following:  
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑡.                                   (12) 
Therefore, the HK (2005) decomposition methodology illustrates that the log of 
country i’s export value to country j in any year t can be decomposed linearly into the 
(logs of the) extensive margin, intensive margin, and country j’s total import value. HK 
(2005) applied their methodology only to a cross-sectional analysis centered around U.S. 
trade partners. However, BBF (2014) applied the HK (2005) decomposition to time-
series data involving bilateral trade flows for 183 countries from 1965 to 2000, these 
countries are listed in Appendix A2. Thus, the trade weights used in constructing 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
and 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡  will change from year to year. To control for the heterogeneous effects of 
PTAs, BBF (2014) adapts specification (8) by employing multiple dummies to control for 
PTA type. In this strategy, specifications (13-15) (see below) include separate dummies 
for OWPTA, TWPTA (PSAs), FTAs, and CUCMEUCU. TWPTAs correspond to the 
PSAs discussed in the introduction section. They distinguished various types of PTAs 
and accounted for their lagged effects as well. Thus, the random growth first-difference 
(RGFD) model with no lags can be described as follows: 
Δ5𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(Δ5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2(Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3(Δ5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(Δ5𝑂𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿5,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5,𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 +   𝜈5,𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                 (13) 
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𝛥5𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1(𝛥5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜃2(𝛥5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜃3(𝛥5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡)
+ 𝜃4(𝛥5𝑂𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿5,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5,𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝜈5,𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                    (14) 
𝛥5𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1(𝛥5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜆2(𝛥5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜆3(𝛥5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) +
                                      𝜆4(𝛥5𝑂𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛿5,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5,𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝜈5,𝑖𝑗𝑡.                                 (15) 
As discussed above, BBF (2014) add lags to the different PTA identification variables 
used in specifications (13) – (15). We denote the lag of the change in the binary variable 
identifying the formation of FTAs by the notation 𝑙𝑎𝑔 Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 . To control for 
endogeneity concerns, they also use the future change in the FTA identifier 
(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡). Similar notation applies to CUs and PSAs. 
The two critical variables of BBF’s (2014) empirical analysis are the bilateral 
trade flows and the binary variables identifying the various PTA types between numerous 
country pairs for several years. They used Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand’s data set13 
and defined the index based on Frankel (1997): no PTA (0), OWPTA (1), TWPTA (2), 
FTA (3), CU (4), common market (5), and monetary union (6). As explained above, BBF 
(2014) combined CU (4), common market (5), and monetary union (6) into CUCMEUCU. 












Table 5: 5-year differenced data 
Variable Set 1 
(RGFD) 
   Set 2 (RGFD)   
 (a) (b) (c)  (a) (b) (c) 





















































































Fixed effects        
Exporter-year 
(𝑖, 𝑡 − (𝑡 − 5)) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
30 
Importer-year 
(𝑗, 𝑡 − (𝑡 − 5)) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair (ij) Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
𝑅2 0.294 0.365 0.357  0.330 0.402 0.403 
No. OBS 48,619 48,619 48,619  41,767 41,767 41,767 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed t-tests. 
Source: BBF (2014, p. 345) 
Table 5 provides the estimation results of Equations (13)–(15) using the RGFD. 
The results are presented in the form of panels Set 1 and Set 2. The former does not 
control for lagged values of explanatory variables while the latter does. Each panel 
reports the results for three alternative LHS variables: bilateral trade, extensive margin, 
and intensive margin. Moreover, BBF (2014) have vertically ordered the list of existing 
PTAs from deeper to shallower economic integration. The results in column (1a) suggest 
that, deeper PTAs (CUs, common markets, and monetary unions) have larger effects on 
aggregate trade flows than FTAs, whereas FTAs have larger effects on trade than partial 
scope or unilateral agreements (OWPTA and TWPTA). The coefficient estimates on 
Δ5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡  and Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡  are economically and statistically significant. The 
extensive margin effects in column 1(b) are statistically significant for deep PTAs and 
FTAs; the effect is largest for deeper agreements (Δ5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡), followed by FTAs 
( Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) . The intensive margin effects in column 1(c) are economically and 
statistically significant for deep PTAs, FTAs, and OWPTA. Similarly, the effect is largest 
for deep PTAs, followed by OWPTA, and slightly smaller for FTAs. In the absence of 
lagged effects, a comparison between sets 1(b) and 1(c) for deep PTAs, FTAs, and 
31 
OWPTAs shows that the intensive margin effect is always larger than the extensive 
margin effect.  
Results are not qualitatively affected by including the lag of explanatory variables. 
However, it is important to capture the effects of 10-year FTA changes in trade and 
margins. As discussed in chapter 2, PTA formation of includes long phase in period for 
preferential tariffs that can take more than 10 years. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) found 
that most of the impact of PTAs on aggregate trade flows was captured using two lagged 
variables of the PTA identificatory, which is equivalent to controlling for the PTA effects 
over 10 years. Considering deep PTAs in the specifications displayed in set 2, the results 
for aggregate trade are consistent with those shown in set 1. According to column 2a, the 
common membership in deep PTAs increases two members’ bilateral trade flow by 
approximately 101% after 10 years (𝑒0.387+0.309 − 1 = 1.01). We also find that the effect 
on trade flows is primarily driven by the intensive margin of trade in the short run.  This 
finding is consistent with BBF’s (2014) hypothesis. Comparing the results in columns 2b 
and 2c, we conclude that the intensive margin effect (0.281) dominates the extensive 
margin effect (0.106) for deep PTAs, with both effects being statistically significant. 
However, the lagged effect of the extensive margin (0.131) is statistically significant and 
larger than the current-period effect of the extensive margin effect. In contrast, the lagged 
intensive margin effect (0.179) is smaller than the current-period intensive margin effect 
(0.281).  
Regarding FTAs, common membership in an FTA increases two members’ 
bilateral trade flows by approximately 60% after 10 years (𝑒0.242+0.228 − 1 = 0.6). Again, 
the intensive margin effects (0.118, 0.145) dominate the extensive margin effects (0.074, 
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0.084). For TWPTA, only the lagged effect (lag ∆5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴) change on ∆5 in 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is statistically significant. For aggregate trade, the results in column 2a indicate that 
common membership in TWPTA increases two members’ bilateral trade flow by 
approximately 20% after 10 years ( 𝑒0.069+0.111 − 1 = 0.2). Furthermore, the results 
suggest that the formation of a TWPTA does not have a statistically significant effect on 
both margins. In the short run, the intensive margin shows a larger effect (0.046) 
compared with the (0.023) effect for the extensive margin. However, the lagged effect of 
a TWPTA seems to yield the opposite result: the intensive margin shows a smaller effect 
(0.041) compared with (0.071) for the extensive margin. In general, the relative effects 
for ∆5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 conformed to earlier result. For OWPTA, the current-period intensive 
margin effect (0.159) was economically and statistically significant and dominated the 
statistically insignificant extensive margin effect (−0.043). In conclusion, BBF (2014) 
conclude that deeper PTAs tend to have a greater effect on bilateral trade flows (BBF., 
2014, p. 346). 
Based on BBF’s (2014) analysis using time-series cross-sectional data, the trade 
weights used in constructing 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 will change over time. Consequently, they 
considered using a “chain-weighted” approach for their RGFD specification to holding 
the trade weights. They used the same chain-weighting technique as that used in national 
income accounts because the LHS variables have a 5-year interval. For the 𝑋𝑊𝑗𝑚𝑡𝑠, they 
used for t the geometric average of trade flows for corresponding years (beginning in 







Table 6: 5-Year Differenced Data (Chained) 
Variable Set 3 (RGFD-chained)    
  (a)  (b)  (c)  
 Δ5 ln 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 Δ5 ln 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 Δ5 ln 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Δ5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.387*** (0.072) 0.113** (0.068) 0.274*** (0.070)  
𝑙𝑎𝑔 Δ5𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.309*** (0.076) 0.124** (0.067) 0.185*** (0.073)  
Δ5𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.242*** (0.056) 0.090** (0.047) 0.152*** (0.050)  
𝑙𝑎𝑔 ΔFTA𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.228*** (0.055) 0.076* (0.048) 0.153*** (0.050)  
Δ5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.069 (0.079) 0.025 (0.064) 0.044 (0.069)  
𝑙𝑎𝑔 𝛥5𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.111* (0.071) 0.053 (0.064) 0.058 (0.069)  
Δ5𝑂𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.116** (0.067) −0.051 (0.055) 0.168** (0.064)  
𝑙𝑎𝑔 Δ5𝑂𝑊𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.285*** (0.069) 0.168*** (0.060) 0.117** (0.068)  
Constant 0.608*** (0.247) −0.066 (0.278) 0.679** (0.348)  
Fixed effects     
Exporter-year 
(𝑖, 𝑡 − (𝑡 − 5)) 
Yes Yes Yes  
Importer-year 
(𝑗, 𝑡 − (𝑡 − 5)) 
Yes Yes Yes  
Country-pair (ij) Yes Yes Yes  
𝑅2 0.330 0.407 0.407  
No. OBS 41,767 41,767 41,767  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed t-tests.  
Source: BBF. (2014, p. 346) 
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Table 6 presents the estimation results of equations (13)–(15) using trade margins 
based on chain-weighted trade weights. Comparing the results between Table 6 and set 2 
of table 5, the alternative weighting approach does not seem to change the main 
conclusion regarding the effects of PTA formation on bilateral trade flow regressions. 
Likewise, the results in sets 3 and 2 do not significantly differ in terms of the effects of 
PTAs in determining the extensive and intensive margins of trade. For deep PTAs, the 
lagged extensive margin effect (0.124) is also statistically significant and larger than the 
current-period extensive margin effect (0.113). The lagged intensive margin effect (0.185) 
is smaller than the current-period intensive margin effect (0.274), as expected. Hence 
supporting similar results found in Table 5. Again, the results shown in Table 6 suggest 
that deeper integration agreements tend to have larger impacts on trade, and the effects of 
PTAs on the intensive margin effects tend to occur faster than extensive margin effects. 
However, selection bias (often referred to as “selection into exporting”) can arise from 
existing fixed exporting costs and may be associated with firm heterogeneity in 
productivity (BBF, 2014, p. 346). Therefore, the results in tables 5 and 6 in BBF (2014) 
are sensitive to the absence of controls for sample selection and firm heterogeneity biases. 
For robustness, they used a panel adaption of Helpman et al.’s (2008) cross-sectional 
approach to controlling for selection bias and firm heterogeneity. The sensitivity analysis 
shows that the results do not significantly differ after correcting for sample selection and 
firm heterogeneity biases using the new approach.  
Section 3.B - Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019) 
The small current levels of tariffs and the large PTA estimates from the existing 
literature demonstrate that the effect of PTAs on bilateral trade exceeds the simple 
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elimination of tariffs. Besides, BBF (2014) shows that the effects of PTAs on trade flows 
and its margins can widely vary depending on the type (depth) of agreement. Thus far, 
only a few theoretically grounded arguments have been proposed as to why these partial 
effects might differ systematically across various agreements. In their work, Baier, 
Yotov, and Zylkin (henceforth BYZ) (2019) aimed to identify meaningful and 
theoretically motivated sources of variation in predicting the effects of trade deals ex ante 
using data on trade and production for 70 countries over the period 1986–2006. These 
countries are listed in Appendix A3. In this section, we focus on the individual effects of 
the most prominent of these PTAs.  
For computational purposes, BYZ (2019) combined 17 countries excluded from 
any PTAs during the period into a single “rest-of-the-world” aggregate region. Then, they 
expanded on the method proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and BBF (2014) to 
obtain the agreement-specific effects for each PTA signed during the period and the 
“direction-of-trade” specific estimates for each member pairing within a given 
agreement.  
Given that PTAs have shifted their focus away from tariffs, an increasing number 
of applied studies in the computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature have attempted 
to identify the impacts of the non-tariff barriers of FTAs on trade flows and welfare 
levels. However, due to the complexity of this issue, even model results based on the 
best-possible estimates of non-tariff barriers may be extremely vulnerable to minor 
variations in methodology (Fugazza & Maur, 2008). Thus, we should interpret these 
estimates cautiously. Although BYZ’s (2019) method lacks the specificity of a fully 
specified CGE framework clearly, they are able to identify several broad sources of 
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variation in PTA effects on trade flows, which have been previously overlooked in the 
literature.  
Importantly, BYZ (2019) examined the effects of individual agreements. By and 
large, most studies have failed to report that most PTAs have increased trade. For 
example, Kohl (2014) found that only 27% of PTAs had positive and significant effects 
on trade. In comparison, BYZ (2019) discovered that the majority (57%) of PTAs had a 
positive effect on trade. They identified three reasons for such a result. First, they 
followed the econometric recommendations of Santos and Tenreyro (2006) by using 
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML), as opposed to OLS, to account for the 
heteroskedasticity of trade data. Then, they also used the information contained in zero 
trade. Second, BYZ (2019) captured the possibility that reducing internal trade would 
increase trading activities between liberalizing countries. Third, as mentioned previously, 
the formation of PTAs includes several adjustments, along with the phasing of different 
provisions that may accompany PTAs. Thus, we should allow agreements to have lagged 









𝐸𝑗.                       (16) 
 Equation (16) is a “structure gravity” equation originally derived by Anderson 
(1979). In turn, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) extended this to the panel dimension. In the 
equation, 𝑋𝑖𝑗  is the value of country i’s export goods to country j, 𝐸𝑗  is the total 
expenditure by purchasers in j on goods across all different origins (including goods 
produced domestically in j), 𝐴𝑖 denotes the overall quality of the production technologies 
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available in country i, 𝑤𝑖 is the wage in i, and 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is the “iceberg” trade cost
14 required to 
send goods from i to j. Thus, the share of j’s expenditure that is specifically allocated to 
products from country i is directly dependent on three factors, namely, 𝐴𝑖, 𝑤𝑖, and 𝜏𝑖𝑗. 
The summation term in the denominator of Equation (16) represents the overall degree of 
competition in j’s import market. Thus, the effects of production cost and trade cost on 
trade are subject to a constant trade elasticity 𝜃 > 1, given that goods from different 
origins are assumed to be imperfectly substitutable. BYZ (2019) used a more compact 






−𝜃 𝐸𝑗 ,                                                                                                                         (17)              
where 𝑃𝑗
−𝜃 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑤𝑖
−𝜃𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝜃
𝑖 . As noted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 𝑃𝑗
−𝜃 is a 
useful aggregate of all bilateral trade costs faced by country j’s consumers. Meanwhile, 
Equation (17) has distinct i, j, and i by j components, thus lending itself naturally to 
deriving a “fixed effects” estimation equation for trade flows. As the general 
determinants of trade frictions have been widely explored in the broader gravity 
literature, such as geographical distance and historical affinities, BYZ (2019) focused 
instead on how changes in 𝜏𝑖𝑗
−𝜃 may vary widely even within the same agreement. Thus, 
they derived a panel implementation of Equation (17) that allowed the identification of an 
average PTA effect across all the agreements in their sample by adding a time subscript t 
and error terms 𝑖𝑗 , 𝑡. Then, they re-wrote Equation (17) in exponential form, as follows: 
 
14 For each good, a certain fraction melts away during the trading process, as if an iceberg is 
“shipped” across the ocean. This can be regarded as a tariff equivalent on imported goods. 
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−𝜃) + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡.            (18) 
BYZ (2019) then used a generic functional form for the trade costs terms 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝑖𝑗,𝑡
−𝜃  shown 
below. 
𝑙𝑛𝜏𝑖𝑗,𝑡
−𝜃 = 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛿 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑡,                                                                 (19) 
where 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an indicator variable reflecting whether i and j have an PTA at time t, 
and 𝑍𝑖𝑗  denotes a set of time-invariant controls for the general level of trade costs 
between country pairs with coefficient vector 𝛿. In addition, 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 is a 5-year lag of 
𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (BYZ, 2019, p. 209). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the time-invariant unobserved 
variable may cause endogeneity bias. A key insight from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is 
that specific knowledge of 𝛿 is neither necessary nor sufficient in obtaining consistent 
estimates of the PTA effects. Instead, drawing on the standard panel estimation technique 
described in Wooldridge (2002), Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recommended using pair-
specific fixed effects in place of 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛿 ; in this way, the time dimension of the panel 
identifies the (average) causal effect of PTAs on trade. BYZ (2019) accounted for the 
same strategy, with their baseline specification for estimating the average effect of PTAs 
on trade barriers shown below. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = exp (𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5) + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡.         (20) 
In the equation, 𝜂𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜓𝑗,𝑡  are the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects 
controlling for all country-level factors on the exporter and on the importer side, 
respectively. In addition, 𝜂𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜓𝑗,𝑡  absorb the 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑤𝑖,𝑡
−𝜃 and 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
−𝜃⁄  terms in 
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Equation (18), which are endogenous and cannot be observed directly. Meanwhile, 𝛾𝑖?̅? is 
a (symmetric) pair-wise fixed effect that strips out all the time-invariant determinants of 
trade barriers between i and j; the additive residual term 𝑖𝑗,𝑡  is used to reflect the 
measurement error in trade values and the absorption of the error term in 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝑖𝑗,𝑡
−𝜃  in 
Equation (18) (BYZ, 2019, p. 209). 
In accordance with the recommendations of Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) for 
minimizing bias in the gravity equation, BYZ (2019) used the PPML estimator to 
perform the estimation of specification (20). In doing so, they obtained their final 
baseline specification for estimating the PTA effects by incorporating the methods of 
Bergstrand et al. (2015), who argued that PTA estimates based on specification (20) may 
be biased upward, because the effects of globalization may be captured. In this process, 
international trade increases may actually occur at the expense of internal trade. Some 
goods are not traded at all, and a proportion of tradeable goods is sold domestically. Thus, 
we need to control for the shrinking amount of production sold domestically over time. 
Adapting a related idea from Yotov (2012), the simple adjustment proposed by 
Bergstrand et al. (2015) aims to control explicitly for the effects of globalization 
dummies. Thus, applied to their setting, this adjustment results in the econometric model 
expressed as 
 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = exp (𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + ψ𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 + ∑ 𝑏𝑡𝑡 )+ 𝑖𝑗.𝑡,                      (21) 
where ∑ 𝑏𝑡𝑡  is a set of indicator variables taking a value of 1 for international trade 
observation at each time t and zero for internal trade observation at each time t. If there 
are trends in globalization over time, the coefficients of these time-varying border 
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dummies (the 𝑏𝑡’s) may increase over time as international trade increase slows down 
and activities with their own internal markets are reduced. 
The average “total” effect of PTAs on trade is constructed as 𝛽 ≡ 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 
because of lagged effects. The specific interpretation of 𝛽 can be described in two ways. 
First, from a strictly econometric perspective, 𝛽 is the total average partial effect of a 
PTA on bilateral trade flows. In this case, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects 
will influence the effect of PTA. Second, 𝛽 gives the average treatment effect of an PTA, 
specifically on “trade cost.” International trade increases do not directly imply reductions 
in the trade cost term (𝑙𝑛𝜏𝑖𝑗,𝑡
−𝜃). Owing to the presence of the time-varying exporter and 
importer fixed effects, only when trade increase between i and j—relative to each 
country’s trade with all other partners—can the PTAs effect (𝛽) be identified. Given that 
the average PTA effect is unable to provide predictions about the effects of specific 
PTAs, BYZ (2019) expanded three successive steps on the initial specification shown in 
(21), with the goal of capturing and analyzing the heterogeneous effect in the PTAs.  
At this point, it should be noted that PTA effects vary based on the level of 
economic integration. First, BYZ (2019) used a distinct average partial effect 𝛽𝐴 ≡
𝛽1,𝐴 + 𝛽2,𝐴 for each individual agreement, using superscript A to index by agreement and 
using subscripts 1 and 2 to refer to the concurrent- and lagged agreement-specific effects, 
respectively. Thus, this first refinement facilitates the acquisition of predictions about 
which PTAs in their sample promote more trade. Accordingly, specification (21) is 
modified to obtain the following: 
 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = exp (𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 + ∑ 𝑏𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡. (22) 
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However, the same agreement may not affect all countries involved in a similar manner. 
Thus, BYZ (2019) allowed for further heterogeneity at the level of each trading pair 
within an agreement.  
𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = exp (𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽1,𝐴:𝑝𝑝∈𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽2,𝐴:𝑑𝑝∈𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 +
∑ 𝑏𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡.                (23) 
Let 𝑝 ∈ 𝐴 denote a pair of countries (i, j) belonging to agreement A, where the notation 
(i, j) and (j, i) represent the same pair: 𝛽𝐴:𝑝 ≡ 𝛽1,𝐴:𝑝 + 𝛽2,𝐴:𝑝 
However, even within a given pair, a PTA may not symmetrically affect trade in 
both directions. Thus, for this last refinement, BYZ (2019) used 𝑑 ∈ 𝐴 to denote a unique 
“direction pair” of countries (𝑖𝑗⃗⃗ ) belonging to agreement A, considering that (i, j) and (j, 
i) are different pairs. Hence, they estimated two effects for each agreement-pair, one for 
each direction of trade. The resulting equation is presented below.  
𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = exp(𝜂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗⃗⃗  ⃗ + ∑ ∑ 𝛽1,𝐴:𝑑𝑑∈𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽2,𝐴:𝑑𝑑∈𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−5 +
∑ 𝑏𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡.                 (24) 
Table 7: Estimates of Agreement-specific Effects 
Agreement  𝛽𝐴  s. e. Agreement 𝛽𝐴 s. e. 
Positive effects:    (cont’d)   
Bulgaria-Turkey† 1.485  0.342 Israel-Mexico 0.553 0.136 
EU-Romania† 1.463  0.142 EU-Turkey† 0.535 0.083 
Romania-Turkey† 1.403  0.165 Canada-Costa Rica 0.492 0.189 
Andean Community† 1.331  0.170 Canada-Israel† 0.481 0.091 
Israel-Turkey† 1.269  0.434 Egypt-Turkey 0.463 0.232 
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EU-Bulgaria† 1.248  0.225 Chile-China 0.462 0.167 
CEFTA† 1.240  0.242 Tunisia-Turkey 0.389 0.109 
EU-Poland† 1.162  0.195 EU-Mexico 0.313 0.095 
Costa Rica-Mexico 1.087  0.461 Chile-US 0.283 0.128 
Mercosur† 1.024  0.205 EU-Tunisia 0.283 0.086 
EU-Hungary† 0.996  0.170 Chile-South Korea 0.275 0.103 
Poland-Turkey† 0.976  0.152    
Bulgaria-Israel† 0.948  0.212 Insignificant effects (𝑝 > 0.05):   
EFTA-Hungary† 0.939  0.244 Jordan-US 0.954 0.684 
Hungary-Turkey† 0.932  0.132 Canada-Chile 0.851 0.447 
EFTA-Poland† 0.921  0.193 Hungary-Israel 0.757 0.400 
EFTA-Romania† 0.890  0.230 Mexico-Uruguay 0.463 0.377 
Colombia-Mexico† 0.762  0.226 Chile-Costa Rica 0.419 0.313 
EFTA-Bulgaria 0.740  0.353 EFTA-Morocco 0.384 0.234 
Japan-Mexico† 0.701  0.115 Mercosur-Chile 0.353 0.244 
NAFTA† 0.662  0.152 EFTA-Turkey 0.299 0.154 
Australia-Thailand† 0.623  0.093 EU-EFTA 0.294 0.184 
Mercosur-Andean† 0.622  0.125 Chile-Mexico 0.266 0.486 
Israel-Poland 0.566  0.202 Agadir Agreement 0.188 0.123 
Summary statistics       
Simple       
Median 𝛽𝐴 estimate:    0.0.463   
Mean 𝛽𝐴 estimate:    0.491   
Variance of estimate:    0.261   
Note: This table reports estimates of the partial PTA effects for all agreements in BYZ’s 
(2019) sample. Standard errors are “three-way” clustered by exporter, importer, and year. 
† denotes estimates that are statistically different from the overall average estimate of 
𝛽 = 0.293. There are 33 such estimates, comprising 50.8% of the total. 
Source: BYZ (2019, p. 214) 
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Table7: Estimates of Agreement-specific Effects (continued) 
Agreement  𝛽𝐴 s. e. 
Insignificant effects ( 𝑝 > .05):   
Cont’d   
Israel-Romania  0.174 0.195 
Pan Arab FTA  0.171 0.192 
EU-Egypt  0.149 0.125 
Australia-Singapore  0.139 0.282 
EU-Morocco  0.117 0.090 
Morocco-US  0.096 0.106 
EU-Chile†  0.045 0.111 
EU† −0.016 0.066 
Mercosur-Bolivia  0.007 0.260 
EFTA-Singapore −0.018 0.248 
ASEAN† −0.107 0.145 
EFTA-Mexico† −0.140 0.142 
EFTA-Israel† −0.213 0.129 
Singapore-US −0.279 0.312 
   
Negative effects:   
Australia-US† −0.170 0.064 
EU-Cyprus† −0.194 0.096 
EU-Israel† −0.256 0.080 
Canada-US† −0.375 0.126 
Chile-Singapore† −1.099 0.174 
   
Summary statistics   
Weight averages   
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By inverse variance  0.293  
By number of country-pairs  0.382  
By (#pair×inv. var):  0.200  
Note: This table reports estimates of the partial PTA effects for all agreements in BYZ’s 
(2019) sample. Standard errors are “three-way” clustered by exporter, importer, and year. 
† denotes estimates that are statistically different from the overall average estimate of 
𝛽 = 0.293. There are 33 such estimates, comprising 50.8% of the total.  
Source: BYZ (2019, p. 214) 
 Tables 7 and Table 7 (continued) present BYZ’s (2019) estimates of agreement-
specific effects that are grouped by sign and significance and listed in descending order. 
As can be seen, 7.6% (5/65) of the coefficient estimates are negative and significant at 
the 5% level ( 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛  0.05 ), while 38.5% (25/65) of the coefficient 
estimates are statistically insignificant. Hence, the majority of agreements in BYZ’s 
(2019) sample have positive and statistically significant partial effects (1-7.6%–
38.5%=53.9%). As shown in Dai et al. (2014), internal trade is a crucial factor in the 
overall reference group for estimating the theoretically consistent effects of trade policies. 
Thus, estimations that include internal trade generally yield larger, more precisely 
estimated PTA effects (BYZ, 2019, p. 213). In the first column of Table 7, we can clearly 
see that some country pairs, such as the Bulgaria–Turkey (1.485), EU–Romania (1.463), 
and EU–Poland (1.162) pairs, have consistently larger (partial equilibrium) impacts from 
PTAs compared with others.  
Moreover, the agreements signed by the Israel–Turkey (1.269) and Costa Rica–
Mexico (1.087) pairs as well as Mercosur (1.024) and the Andean Community (1.331) 
generally have strong effects. Aside from Israel and Turkey, other Mediterranean nations 
have generally experienced more modest impacts. However, Tarlea (2018) considered A 
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negative coefficient estimated for export growth rate might not thus imply less trade. It 
can suggest a deceleration of trade, such as Canada–US pair. These results are not 
indicative of an actual slowdown in trade during negotiations in absolute terms. Overall, 
the estimates from Tables 7 and Table 7 (continued) confirm that PTAs have had very 
heterogeneous effects on trade. For robustness, BYZ (2019) deepened the analysis in 
three important ways: (1) they examined how the same agreement can affect different 
pairs of member countries, (2) they used direction-specific PTA effects to determine how 
the agreement can affect the country specifically, and (3) they placed greater emphasis on 
agreement-pair level and direction-specific PTA estimates to obtain more precise results. 
Table 8 and Table 8 (continued) present summaries of the heterogeneities 
observed by BYZ (2019) after performing the agreement-pair level and direction-specific 
estimates, respectively. Both tables offer snapshots of the substantial variation in partial 
effects, which can be observed within a single agreement. BYZ (2019) used the EU as 
their example, because it is the largest agreement in the sample so far. In fact, there are 
98 distinct pair-specific effects and 196 direction-specific effects in their analysis (BYZ, 
2019). However, rather than show all these estimates, Table 8 roughly presents the upper 
and lower quartiles from the pair-specific effects, while Table 8 (continued) presents 
some examples of asymmetries within pairs. Similar to Table 7 and Table 7 (continued), 
the estimates of agreement-specific effects in Table 8 are also grouped by sign and 
significance and then listed in descending order. As discussed in BYZ (2019), 27.6% 
(27/98) of pairwise estimates are positive and statistically significant, while 13.3% 







Table 8: Heterogeneities in EU Accession Effects 
Pair  𝛽𝐸𝑈:𝑝 s. e. Pair 𝛽𝐸𝑈:𝑝 s. e. 
Largest EU accession effects (by 
pair): 
      
Hungary-Poland*† 2.186 0.487 Germany-Sweden*† −0.220 0.107 
Cyprus-Finland*† 1.711 0.399 Finland-Italy† −0.256 0.136 
Hungary-Malta*† 1.600 0.571 Hungary-Ireland† −0.269 0.264 
Austria-Malta* 1.101 0.514 Ireland-Sweden*† −0.291 0.144 
Cyprus-Netherlands*† 0.716 0.135 Cyprus-Malta −0.307 0.371 
Cyprus-UK 0.703 0.370 Finland-Sweden*† −0.312 0.102 
Cyprus-Italy* 0.555 0.139 Denmark-Malta† −0.327 0.193 
France-Poland* 0.517 0.147 Finland-UK*† −0.331 0.133 
Cyprus-Hungary* 0.503 0.251 Cyprus-Ireland*† −0.334 0.159 
BLX-Cyprus* 0.493 0.176 Finland-Ireland*† −0.356 0.125 
Finland-Hungary 0.470 0.418 Italy-Sweden*† −0.360 0.087 
UK-Poland* 0.469 0.225 BLX-Hungary† −0.399 0.210 
Cyprus-Greece* 0.457 0.196 Denmark-Finland*† −0.443 0.150 
Cyprus-Germany* 0.456 0.153 Cyprus-Denmark*† −0.455 0.213 
Denmark-Hungary* 0.437 0.149 Italy-Malta† −0.584 0.403 
BLX-Sweden* 0.431 0.129 Finland-Portugal† −0.630 0.441 
Spain-Poland 0.412 0.228 Portugal-Sweden*† −0.694 0.353 
UK-Hungary 0.400 0.218 Ireland-Malta*† −1.069 0.232 
Austria-BLX* 0.394 0.086 Cyprus-Poland*† −1.220 0.247 
Austria-Spain* 0.375 0.191 Greece-Malta*† −1.819 0.308 
Italy-Poland* 0.370 0.168    
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BLX-Finland* 0.352 0.100    
Austria-Poland* 0.352 0.105    
Germany-Poland* 0.334 0.110    
      
Small and negative EU accession 
effects (by pair): 
     
Austria-Sweden† −0.202 0.107    
Germany-Malta† −0.205 0.112    
Greece-Sweden† −0.210 0.255    
UK-Sweden† −0.213 0.143    
Note: This table reports examples of pair-specific and asymmetric estimated partial 
effects for the EU accessions. * denotes estimates that are statistically different from 0. † 
denotes estimates that are statistically different from the overall average estimate of 𝛽 =
0.293. 
Source: BYZ (2019, p. 215) 
Table 8: Heterogeneity in EU Accession Effects (continued) 




      
Netherlands →
Austria* 
0.418 0.158 UK →Sweden 0.048 0.197 
Austria →
Netherlands*† 
−0.486 0.162 Sweden →UK*† −0.431 0.182 
Poland →Spain* 0.795 0.258 Spain →Sweden 0.285 0.209 
Spain →Poland 0.057 0.183 Sweden →Spain† −0.152 0.207 
Poland →UK*† 0.825 0.266 Poland →Austria* 0.575 0.186 
UK →Poland 0.100 0.184 Austria →Poland 0.157 0.152 





−0.353 0.200 Netherlands →Poland 0.157 0.158 
Spain →Austria*† 0.734 0.212 Sweden →Austria −0.105 0.224 
Austria →Spain 0.110 0.187 Austria →Sweden† −0.293 0.239 
Poland →Sweden* 0.549 0.223 UK →Austria 0.342 0.141 
Sweden →Poland 0.040 0.156 Austria →UK 0.197 0.147 
      
Summary of within-
EU estimates pairwise 
estimates (𝛽𝐸𝑈:𝑝): 









 27/98 (27.6%) #positive and 
significant 
 37/196 (18.9%) 
#negative and 
significant 
 13/98 (13.3%) #negative and 
significant 
 26/196 (13.3%) 
#statistically different 
from 𝛽 = 0.293 
 41/98 (41.8%) #statistically different 
from 𝛽 = 0.293 
 82/196 (41.8%) 
Note: The arrows indicate the direction of trade. This table reports examples of pair-
specific and asymmetric estimated partial effects for the EU accessions. * denotes 
estimates that are statistically different from 0. † denotes estimates that are statistically 
different from the overall average estimate of β = 0.293. 
Source: BYZ (2019, p. 215) 
Compared to those in Tables 7 and Table 7 (continued), the rankings of the 
various estimates in Table 8 and Table 8 (continued) seem to display greater 
heterogeneity, suggesting that country-pair specific analysis is required to understand the 
effects of PTAs across members. In fact, BYZ (2019) expected that more detailed 
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estimates would exhibit greater estimation noise. Importantly, Table 8 (continued) 
presents some representative examples of EU pairs in which country-pair asymmetries in 
the EU effect seem paramount. For instance, asymmetries in the Poland–Spain and 
Poland–UK pairs (as exporters) seem quite relevant. Poland’s accession led to a greater 
increase in Polish exports to existing EU members than imports from them. On the 
contrary, the results in Table 8 (continued) show that Austrian imports tend to increase 
much more than their exports to other EU members. Simultaneously, one may find 
similar patterns for Sweden (as an acceding country in 1995) in terms of its EU effects 
with other members. Overall, these examples suggest that, even within certain 
agreements, there can be large, country-specific heterogeneous PTA effects that are 















                                              
Chapter 4 - Conclusion 
 In this report, we briefly describe the evolution and relative importance of 
various types of PTAs. We have also explained the rules allowing for trade to be 
preferentially liberalized between two countries or among a small group of countries. 
PTAs not only focus on phasing out tariffs; in many cases, also involve promoting 
conditions to increase cross-border investments, facilitate trade-related dispute resolution, 
and, sometimes to establish competition policies. Our focus is the discussion of the main 
papers that evaluate the impacts of PTAs on international trade flows.  
First, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) provided a thorough empirical analysis of the 
average treatment effect of FTAs on trade. In accordance with their work, we can confirm 
that the trade creation effect of PTAs is really large and that it is important to account for 
the long tariff phase out periods that are characteristic of these agreements. However, 
BBF (2014) illustrated that the magnitude of the effect depends on the type of PTAs, 
where deeper integration agreements clearly have larger impacts on aggregate trade flows 
and in trade margins than shallower agreements. In addition, the intensive margin effects 
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Table A.1 below lists the 96 countries that have been potentially used in the regressions, 
depending on the availability of non-zero and non-missing trade flows. 
Table A.2 below lists the 183 countries that joined EIAs included in Baier and 
Bergstrand’s data set for 2014. 
Table A.3 below lists the 70 countries that have been used for quantifying and studying 
heterogeneity in the effects of PTAs. 
Table A.1: Countries Used in the Regressions 
 
Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 93) 
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Table A.2: Countries Joined EIAs 
 
Source: Country list in Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance (2015) 
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Table A.3: Countries used for quantifying and studying heterogeneity in the effect of PTAs 
       
Source: BYZ (2019, p. 225) 
 
 
 
